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I.  INTRODUCTION 
This article provides an overview of justice for crimes perpetrated in the 
former Yugoslavia during the wars in the 1990s.  It concludes with reflections 
about lessons learned for future accountability endeavors—particularly, the 
model of having a three-tiered approach to justice in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
consisting of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons 
Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law 
Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991 (ICTY or 
Tribunal), the hybrid War Crimes Chamber of the State Court of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (War Crimes Chamber), and local courts in Bosnia.  It ends with 
reflections as to whether, if it someday becomes possible, such a three-tiered 
approach would be a good model to ensure justice for crimes being 
perpetrated in Syria or in any other situation of very large-scale atrocities. 
II.  REFLECTING ON THE ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF THE ICTY 
Tremendous strides have been made over the past twenty years towards 
ensuring justice for crimes perpetrated in the former Yugoslavia during the 
1990s.  Looking back to the time when the Dayton Peace Accords were 
negotiated,1 justice was still in its infancy.  The ICTY had been created in 
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1993 by the United Nations (U.N.) Security Council,2 to sit in The Hague, 
Netherlands.  The Tribunal could not be located in the former Yugoslavia, 
since, at the time of the Tribunal’s creation, armed conflict was still ongoing 
in the region. 
It took time for the Tribunal to commence prosecutions.  It started with 
the prosecution of the relatively low-level case of Duško Tadić,3 because he 
was already in custody in Germany.  In the early years, the Tribunal was not 
yet taken particularly seriously.  For instance, despite its creation, in July 
1995, Republika Srpska Armed Forces (VRS), under the command of 
General Ratko Mladić, committed the Srebrenica massacre4—subsequently 
adjudicated to constitute genocide.5  Clearly, they were not deterred by the 
Tribunal’s early existence.  Even when self-proclaimed President of 
Republika Srpska, Radovan Karadžić, and VRS military commander Ratko 
Mladić were indicted,6 they initially traveled around openly, with little fear 
of arrest.7  And, Serbian forces were not deterred in 1999 from commencing 
ethnic cleansing in Kosovo.8 
Yet, eventually, the first international criminal tribunal since the 
International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg9 commenced trials and 
                                                          
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA (HRW 2006).  Research assistance 
for this article was provided by Erin Lovall. 
1. General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (“Dayton Peace 
Agreement”), Bosn. & Herz.-Croat.-Fed. Repub. Yugo., Dec. 14, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 75. 
2. S.C. Res. 827 (May 25, 1993). 
3. Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Opinion and Judgment, (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the 
Former Yugoslavia May 7, 1997), aff’d, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999). 
4. Dan Bilefsky & Somini Sengupta, Srebrenica Massacre, After 20 Years, Still Casts a Long 
Shadow in Bosnia, N.Y. TIMES (July 8, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/09/world/ 
europe/srebrenica-genocide-massacre.html?_r=1. 
5. Prosecutor v. Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 530–40 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the 
Former Yugoslavia Aug. 2, 2001), aff’d, Case No. IT-98-33-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 19, 2004). 
6. Prosecutor v. Karadžić & Mladić, Case No. IT-95-5-I, Initial Indictment “Bosnia and 
Herzegovina” (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 24, 1995); Prosecutor v. Karadžić & 
Mladić, Case No. IT-95-18-I, Initial Indictment “Srebrenica” (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia 
Nov. 14, 1995). 
7. GARY J. BASS, STAY THE HAND OF VENGEANCE:  THE POLITICS OF WAR CRIMES 
TRIBUNALS 249, 255 (2000). 
8. Ethnic Cleansing in Kosovo:  An Accounting, U.S. DEP’T STATE 1, 3 (1999), https://www. 
state.gov/www/global/human_rights/kosovoii/pdf/kosovii.pdf. 
9. Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European 
Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, 82 U.N.T.S. 279 (agreement creating the Charter of the International Military Tribunal 
to be first held at Nuremberg).  The Tribunal tried a total of twenty-two defendants, of whom nineteen 
were convicted, twelve of whom were sentenced to death.  For background on the Nuremberg Tribunal, 
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eventually became a full and well-functioning institution.10  Karadžić and 
Mladić were driven off the political and military stages, respectively, with 
Karadžić disguising himself under an assumed name11 and Mladić in hiding12 
until their eventual arrests.13  The Tribunal eventually issued indictments all 
the way up to Serbian President Slobodan Milošević,14 although he died 
during the pendency of his ICTY trial.15  The Tribunal also succeeded in 
indicting on all sides of the conflict, including crimes perpetrated by Bosnian 
Muslims, Croats, and Kosovar Albanians.16 
The Tribunal has made historic jurisprudential firsts.  There have been 
prosecutions focused on the use of rape as a weapon of war—for instance the 
running of a notorious rape camp in Foča, in the Kunarac decision.17  Rape 
was eventually prosecuted as a crime against humanity,18 a war crime,19 and 
                                                          
see generally MICHAEL R. MARRUS, THE NUREMBURG WAR CRIMES TRIAL 1945–46:  A DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY (Katherine E. Kurzman et al. eds., 1997). 
10. The ICTY indicted 161, resulting in 83 convictions, 19 acquittals, 7 ongoing proceedings, 
and 2 to be retried by the Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals (MICT).  Infographic:  ICTY 
Facts & Figures, UNITED NATIONS INT’L CRIM. TRIBUNAL FOR FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, 
http://www.icty.org/en/content/infographic-icty-facts-figures (last visited Mar. 3, 2017) [hereinafter ICTY 
Infographic]. 
11. Nicholas Kulish & Graham Bowley, The Double Life of an Infamous Serbian Fugitive, N.Y. 
TIMES (July 23, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/23/world/europe/23karadzic.html?pagewanted 
=all. 
12. How Ratko Mladic Stayed Hidden After Bosnia War, BBC NEWS (May 26, 2011), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-13562118. 
13. Julian Borger, Radovan Karadzic, Europe’s Most Wanted Man, Arrested for War Crimes, 
GUARDIAN (July 21, 2008, 7:01 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/jul/22/warcrimes. 
internationalcrime; Colum Lynch, Serbia Arrests Ratko Mladic on War Crimes Charges, WASH. POST 
(May 26, 2011), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/serbia-arrests-ratko-mladic-on-war-crimes-
charges/2011/05/26/AGXID1BH_story.html?utm_term=.c6e4adcad9b1. 
14. Prosecutor v. Milošević, Case No. IT-99-37, Initial Indictment “Kosovo” (Int’l Crim. Trib. 
for the Former Yugoslavia May 22, 1999). 
15. Molly Moore & Daniel Williams, Milosevic Found Dead in Prison, WASH. POST (Mar. 12, 
2006), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/03/11/AR2006031100525. html. 
16. See generally ICTY Case List, UNITED NATIONS INT’L CRIM. TRIBUNAL FOR FORMER 
YUGOSLAVIA, http://www.icty.org/action/cases/4 (last visited Mar. 2, 2017). 
17. Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23 & 23/1, Trial Chamber Judgment, ¶ 28 (Int’l 
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 22, 2001). 
18. Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23 & 23/1A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶¶ 127–
29 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 12, 2002); Prosecutor v. Kvočka, Case No. IT-98-
30/1, Trial Chamber Judgment ¶¶ 175, 180–83 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 2, 2001) 
aff’d, Case No. IT-98-30/1-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia 
June 12, 2002). 
19. Prosecutor v. Kvočka, Case No. IT-98-30/1A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶ 395 (Int’l 
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 28, 2005); Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23 & 23/1A ¶¶ 127–29 
(2002). 
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a form of torture.20  It also was prosecuted as an underlying crime of genocide 
by the ICTY’s sister tribunal, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
(ICTR),21 created to sit in Arusha, Tanzania, and try top perpetrators of the 
1994 Rwandan genocide.22 
The ICTY has issued judgments that the killing of more than 8300 
Bosnian men and boys in and around Srebrenica starting on July 11, 1995 
was genocide, in Krstić,23 as well as other, decisions.24  It charged a high-
level female perpetrator, the President of Republika Srpska, Biljana Plavšić, 
who entered a guilty plea to persecution as a crime against humanity.25 
Ultimately, of the 161 indicted, the Tribunal achieved a 100% success 
rate on arrests, with no fugitives at large.26  Of course, the Tribunal did not 
achieve this alone.  None of the war crimes tribunals have arrest capabilities, 
but rely upon state cooperation to effectuate arrests.27  In the former 
Yugoslavia, in the early years, the countries in the region showed no interest 
in cooperating, but that gradually changed with the policy of 
“conditionality,” whereby the United States conditioned financial assistance 
to countries in the region, and the European Union (EU) conditioned progress 
                                                          
20. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23 & 23/1A ¶¶ 150–51 (2002). 
21. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4, Trial Chamber Judgment, ¶ 688 (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. for Rwanda Sept. 2, 1998) (explaining rape and other acts of sexual violence constitute infliction of 
“serious bodily or mental harm” on members of the group.); see Jennifer Trahan, Genocide, War Crimes 
and Crimes against Humanity:  A Digest of the Case law of the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda (HRW 2010) (for a compilation of the case law of the ICTR). 
22. S.C. Res 955 (Nov. 8, 1994) (resolution created the ICTR). 
23. Prosecutor v. Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 530–40 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the 
Former Yugoslavia Aug. 2, 2001), aff’d, Case No. IT-98-33-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. For the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 19, 2004). 
24. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Popović, Case No. IT-05-88, Trial Chamber Judgment (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 10, 2010) aff’d, Case No. IT-05-88-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment 
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 30, 2015); see also, e.g., Prosecutor v. Tolimir, Case 
No. IT-05-88/2, Trial Chamber Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 12, 2012), 
aff’d, Case No. IT-05-88/2-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia 
Apr. 8, 2015). 
25. Prosecutor v. Plavšić, Case No. IT-0039 & 40/1, Trial Chamber Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. 
for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 27, 2003).  Cf. Prosecutor v. Nyiramasuhuko, Case No. ICTR-98-42-T 
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda June 24, 2011), app’l filed (parallel ICTR case convicting Rwandan Minister 
for Family Welfare and the Advancement of Women Pauline Nyiramasuhuko, for genocide, conspiracy 
to commit genocide, and incitement to rape); see generally Sam Sasan Shoamanesh, Nyiramasuhuko:  The 
Mother Who Awarded Rape for Murder, WORLD POST (Aug. 9, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com 
/sam-sasan-shoamanesh/nyiramasuhuko-the-mother-_b_922216.html (explaining how Nyiramasuhuko 
was the first woman convicted by the ICTR, and first woman to be tried and convicted by an international 
criminal tribunal). 
26. See ICTY Infographic, supra note 10. 
27. Mary Margaret Penrose, No Badges, No Bars:  A Conspicuous Oversight in the 
Development of an International Criminal Court, 38 TEX. INT’L L.J. 621, 625 (2003). 
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towards EU accession, on cooperation with the ICTY, particularly arrests and 
surrenders.28 
The ICTY has also adjudicated cases covering key major crime scenes.  
For instance: 
a) the sniping and shelling of civilians in Sarajevo (the Galić and 
Dragomir Milošević cases);29 
b) the decision that Srebrenica is genocide (the Krstić and other 
cases);30 
c) atrocity crimes in camps in Prijedor, such as running of the 
notorious Omarska camp;31 and 
d) the Vukovar hospital massacre.32 
Additionally, the Tribunal has produced a wealth of generally well-
reasoned jurisprudence.  There is now abundant case law on the parameters 
of the crimes of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, as well 
as individual and command responsibility, and procedural and other 
substantive law.33 
                                                          
28. See JULIE KIM, Cong. Research Serv., RS 22097, BALKAN COOPERATION ON WAR CRIMES 
ISSUES (2008); see also STEVEN WOEHREL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS 21686, CONDITIONS ON U.S. 
AID TO SERBIA (2008). 
29. Prosecutor v. Galić, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, (Int’l Crim. Trib. for 
the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 5, 2004), aff’d, Case No. IT-98-29-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment (Int’l 
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 3, 2006); Prosecutor v. Milošević, Case No. IT-98-29/1-T, 
Trial Chamber Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 12, 2007), aff’d, Case No. IT-
98-29/1-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 12, 2009). 
30. See Prosecutor v. Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 530–40 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for 
the Former Yugoslavia Aug. 2, 2001), aff’d, Case No. IT-98-33-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment (Int’l 
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 19, 2004); Prosecutor v. Popović, Case No. IT-05-88, Trial 
Chamber Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 10, 2010) aff’d, Case No. IT-05-
88-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 30, 2015) 
31. See Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Opinion and Judgment, (Int’l Crim. Trib. for 
the Former Yugoslavia May 7, 1997), aff’d, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999); see also Prosecutor v. Kvočka, Case No. IT-98-30/1, 
Trial Chamber Judgment ¶¶ 175, 180–183 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 2, 2001) 
aff’d, Case No. IT-98-30/1-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia 
June 12, 2002). 
32. Prosecutor v. Mrkšić, Case No. IT-95-13/1-T, Trial Chamber Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. 
for the Former Yugoslavia Sept. 27, 2007), aff’d, Case No. IT-95-13/1-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment 
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 5, 2009). 
33. For a compilation of the case law, see JENNIFER TRAHAN, GENOCIDE, WAR CRIMES AND 
CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY:  A TOPICAL DIGEST OF THE CASE LAW OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA (Human Rights Watch 2006). 
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Nonetheless, there are some less successful moments at the ICTY.  
When Slobodan Milošević died mid-way through his trial,34 the Prosecutor 
was roundly criticized for trying him on too many counts35—three separate 
indictments with a total of sixty-six counts, covering crimes in Croatia, 
Bosnia, and Kosovo.36  That of course is an easy criticism to make in 
hindsight, and a counter-argument for broad charging can also be made for 
the sake of establishing a comprehensive and accurate historical record for 
future generations, and ensuring justice for the most significant crimes.  
There are high-level acquittals in the cases of Momčilo Perišić, chief of the 
general staff of the Yugoslav Army, VJ,37 and Croatian General Ante 
Gotovina, who was the operational commander of the southern portion of the 
Krajina region during the Croatian military offensive known as “Operation 
Storm.”38  Both acquittals seem less than well-reasoned,39 as does the recent 
acquittal in the Šešelj case.40  These I would suggest, are the jurisprudential 
low-points.  Subsequent Appellate Chambers have since rejected the Perišić 
aiding and abetting standard,41 and the Šešelj case is on appeal, so may still 
be reversed. 
Additionally, the ICTY’s Outreach Program has faced difficulties in 
conveying the achievements of the ICTY to the public in the former 
                                                          
34. Moore & Williams, supra note 15. 
35. Molly Moore, Trial of Milosevic Holds Lessons for Iraqi Prosecutors, WASH. POST (Oct. 
18, 2005), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2005/10/17/AR2005101701496.html. 
36. Prosecutor v. Milošević, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Second Amended Indictment “Croatia” 
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 28, 2004); Prosecutor v. Milošević, Case No. IT-02-54-
T, Amended Indictment “Bosnia and Herzegovina” (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 22, 
2002); Prosecutor v. Milošević, Case No. IT-99-37-PT, Second Amended Indictment “Kosovo” (Int’l 
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 16, 2001). 
37. Prosecutor v. Perišić, Case No. IT-04-81-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. 
for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 28, 2013). 
38. Prosecutor v. Gotovina, Case No. IT-06-90-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 16, 2012). 
39. For a critical discussion of the Perišić case, see Jennifer Trahan & Erin Lovall, The ICTY 
Appellate Chamber’s Acquittal of Momčilo Perišić:  The Specific Direction Element of Aiding and 
Abetting Should be Rejected or Modified to Explicitly Include a ‘Reasonable Person’ Due Diligence 
Standard, 40 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 171 (2015).  For a critical discussion of the Gotovina case, see Janine 
Natalya Clark, Courting Controversy:  The ICTY’s Acquittal of Croatian Generals Gotovina and Markač, 
11 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 399 (2013). 
40. Prosecutor v. Šešelj, Case No. IT-03-67-T, Trial Chamber Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for 
the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 31, 2016). 
41. See Prosecutor v. Stanišić, Case No. IT-03-69-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶¶ 106–
08 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 9, 2015) (“the Trial Chamber erred in law by 
requiring that the acts of the aider and abettor be specifically directed to assist the commission of a 
crime”); Prosecutor v. Popović, Case No. IT-05-88-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for 
the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 30, 2015); Prosecutor v. Šainović, Case No. IT-05-87-A, Appeals Chamber 
Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 23, 2014). 
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Yugoslavia.42  The program was created late, only in 1999, as the need for 
outreach was not originally envisioned when the Tribunal was created.43  
Unfortunately, it has never been seen as particularly central to the Tribunal’s 
work, remaining over the years outside the Tribunal’s ordinary budget.44  But 
most of all, it has faced particular challenges given, first, Republika Srpska 
and Serbian denial of crimes,45 and then later, partial denial of crimes, which 
represents the current state of affairs.46  For instance, authorities from 
Republika Srpska and Serbia now admit crimes happened at Srebrenica, 
which they originally did not, but deny that the crimes constitute genocide, 
despite that determination having been adjudicated multiple times.47  This 
denial was repeated at the international level when Russia vetoed the United 
Kingdom’s (UK) draft resolution before the U.N. Security Council that, on 
the twentieth anniversary of the Srebrenica genocide, would have 
acknowledge the crimes as genocide.48 
Thus, despite the ICTY’s existence and all its accomplishments, 
unfortunately, we still see alarmingly nationalistic narratives coming from 
some political figures and others in the region.  Perhaps it is unrealistic to 
think that any one tribunal, no matter how successful, could change that 
dynamic.  Overall, however, the work of the ICTY has been a success. 
III.  DOMESTIC PROSECUTIONS IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 
The victims of crimes perpetrated in the former Yugoslavia no doubt 
would not fully share this optimistic assessment of the ICTY’s work.49  A 
                                                          
42. David Tolbert, Reflections on the ICTY Registry, 2 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 480, 482 (2004). 
43. Id. 
44. ICTY Outreach Programme Annual Report, UNITED NATIONS, 37 (2013), 
http://www.icty.org/x/file/Outreach/annual_reports/annual_report_2013_en.pdf. 
45. Koen S. Kluessien, A Conspiracy of Denial:  Serbian Politicians and their Unwillingness 
to Deal with the Troubled Past of the Srebrenica Genocide, CLARK U. CLARK DIGITAL COMMONS (Apr. 
10, 2015), http://commons.clarku.edu/chgspapers/15.  
46. Mersiha Gadzo, Time to Identify Srebrenica Massacre as Genocide, AL JAZEERA AM. (July 
8, 2015, 2:45 AM), http://america.aljazeera.com/opinions/2015/7/20-years-later-it-is-time-to-identify-
srebrenica-massacre-as-genocide.html. 
47. Id.; see also Tolimir, Case No. IT-05-88/2 (2012); Prosecutor v. Popović, Case No. IT-05-
88, Trial Chamber Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 10, 2010), aff’d, Case No. 
IT-05-88-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 30, 2015); 
Prosecutor v. Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 530–40 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former 
Yugoslavia Aug. 2, 2001), aff’d, Case No. IT-98-33-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for 
the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 19, 2004). 
48. Russia Vetoes UN Move to Call Srebrenica ‘Genocide’, BBC NEWS (July 8, 2015), http:// 
www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-33445772. 
49. Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Views on War Crimes, the ICTY, and 
the National War Crimes Judiciary, Survey 30 (Dec. 8, 2009), http://www.academia.edu/10883773/ 
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focus on higher-level perpetrators at the ICTY has meant that most first-hand 
trigger-pullers—those who murdered the person “down the street”—would 
not be prosecuted in The Hague.50  Such prosecutions have been left to courts 
in the region.51 
Thus, for example in Bosnia, there is a three-tiered approach to justice.52  
In addition, to the ICTY, there is the hybrid War Crimes Chamber,53 as well 
as local courts.  The War Crimes Chamber, which was developed in part to 
handle ICTY transfer cases as the ICTY was implementing its “completion 
strategy,”54 is based on an interesting model of a hybrid tribunal that converts 
to a national court.  It started with panels of international judges in the 
majority, then converted to international judges in the minority after a certain 
period of years, and finally converted to fully national panels, which is where 
it stands today.55  Thus, it started as an internationalized institution and 
continues as a local war crimes—and organized crime—chamber.56  This 
aspect of the War Crimes Chamber is a merit-worthy model, as opposed to 
other hybrid tribunals that, despite other significant accomplishments, have 
simply closed after a period of years, such as the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone.57  The War Crimes Chamber, by contrast, is designed to continue 
                                                          
Why_testify_Witnesses_motivations_for_giving_evidence_in_a_war_crimes_tribunal_in_Sierra_Leone 
(e.g., question:  “How do you think that the trials before ICTY affect the victims of war crimes and their 
families?” 45% of respondents chose the response:  “The victims and their families do not see the ICTY 
as just, because those who made them victims are not tried or are tried too slowly and they are much too 
leniently punished.”). 
50. Understanding the International Criminal Court, ICC, https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs 
/pids/publications/uicceng.pdf (last visited Mar. 25, 2017). 
51. Id. 
52. See generally Delivering Justice in Bosnia and Herzegovina:  An Overview of 
War Crimes Processing from 2005 to 2010, OSCE 1, 43 (2011), http://www.osce.org/bih/108103? 
download=true.  
53. The Case Law of the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, COURT OF BOSNIA & 
HERZEGOVINA, http://www.sudbih.gov.ba/?jezik=e (last visited Mar. 13, 2017). 
54. Pipina T. Katsaris, The Domestic Side of the ICTY Completion Strategy:  Focus on Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, 78 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT PÉNALE 348 (2007). 
55. Bogdan Ivanišević, The War Crimes Chamber in Bosnia and Herzegovina:  From Hybrid 
to Domestic Court, INT’L CTR. FOR TRANSITIONAL JUST. 1, 943 (2008) (regarding the inclusion and 
eventual phase-out of international personnel). 
56. Id. 
57. Justice in Motion:  The Trial Phase of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, HUM. RTS. 
WATCH (Nov. 2, 2005), https://www.hrw.org/report/2005/11/02/justice-motion/trial-phase-special-court-
sierra-leone [hereinafter Justice in Motion].  The Special Court for Sierra Leone adjudicated cases against 
the three key warring factions during Sierra Leone’s 1991–2002 civil war. Id.  The Special Court is 
currently in its residual mechanisms phase.  Special Court for Sierra Leone Residual Special Court for 
Sierra Leone, RSCSL, http://www.rscsl.org/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2017) (discussing details of SCSL 
residual mechanism). 
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prosecuting war crimes cases long after the international staff has left.58  
However, the work of the War Crimes Chamber has slowed in the last few 
years, with criticism that they are prosecuting only simple cases, and not 
coming even close to delivering on the goals set for the court in the National 
Strategy for the Processing of War Crimes Cases—National War Crimes 
Strategy.59 
Even the War Crime Chamber in Sarajevo, however, cannot conduct all 
the prosecutions in Bosnia, where the National War Crimes Strategy has 
estimated the existence of tens of thousands of perpetrators.60  The goal of 
the War Crimes Strategy is to prioritize the more complex cases so that they 
are tried before the War Crimes Chamber, which has stronger witness 
protection mechanisms.61  The War Crimes Strategy emphasizes the need to 
process the most complex and highest priority war crimes cases within seven 
years, and other war crimes cases within fifteen years.62 
The third level of prosecutions in Bosnia-Herzegovina is occurring 
before Cantonal Courts in the Federation, District Courts in Republika 
Srpska, and one court in the Brčko District.63  Observer reports suggest that 
local war crimes prosecutions vary significantly in quality.64  The author has 
                                                          
58. Looking for Justice:  The War Crimes Chamber in Bosnia and Herzegovina, HUM. RTS. 
WATCH 6 (Feb. 7, 2006), https://www.hrw.org/report/2006/02/07/looking-justice/war-crimes-chamber-
bosnia-and-herzegovina. 
59. Justice in Motion, supra note 57, at 10. 
60. Bosnia-Herzegovina, Shelving Justice-War Crimes Prosecutions in Paralysis, AMNESTY 
INT’L, EUR 63/018/2003 (Nov. 12, 2003), https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/eur63/018/2003/en/ 
.pdf. 
61. National Strategy for Processing of War Crimes Cases Adopted, MINISTRY JUST. BOSNIA 
& HERZEGOVINA (Dec. 30, 2008, 2:09 PM), http://www.mpr.gov.ba/aktuelnosti/vijesti/default.aspx? 
id=573&langTag=en-US [hereinafter National Strategy]; see Looking for Justice:  The War Crimes 
Chamber in Bosnia and Herzegovina, supra note 58, at 16.  
62. National Strategy, supra note 61.  This time-table is not being met. 
63. Bosnia and Herzegovina:  Local Courts Face Obstacles in War Crimes Trials, HUM. RTS. 
WATCH (July 10, 2008, 8:00 PM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2008/07/10/bosnia-and-herzegovina-local-
courts-face-obstacles-war-crimes-trials (“It is estimated that several thousand unresolved case files 
involving very serious crimes committed during the 1992–95 war remain that may be tried before the 
cantonal courts in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and district courts in Republika Srpka (‘the 
two entities that make up Bosnia and Herzegovina’)”). 
64. According to Human Rights Watch: 
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personally met with a rape survivor who was supposed to be a “protected 
witness” in a prosecution in Republika Srpska, until her face was shown on 
the evening news.65  Clearly, not all local courts are successfully 
accomplishing their work. 
In Croatia, there have been war crimes prosecutions in the largest 
district courts.66  Yet, Croatia, overall, has done the fewest number of war 
crimes prosecutions.67  On the other hand, there were also the smallest 
number of crimes committed in Croatia, certainly compared to Bosnia, so 
Croatia had less to prosecute.68 
In Serbia, war crimes prosecutions have occurred at the Belgrade Higher 
Court’s War Crimes Department.69  However, to date, prosecutions have 
mainly focused on lower-level and paramilitary perpetrators, rather than 
prosecuting up the chain of command, or focusing on regular or police forces 
in Serbia.70  That witness protection is run by the police71 is distinctly 
unhelpful, making it hard to imagine how any “insider” police witness could 
be effectively protected.  The “glass half-full” evaluation is that at least 
Serbia is conducting war crimes prosecutions; the “glass half-empty” 
evaluation is that it is doing a partial approach.  Even the prosecutions that 
the War Crimes Prosecutor has accomplished seem deeply unpopular with 
the majority population in Serbia, which is still unfortunately strongly 
nationalistic in outlook.72 
                                                          
The obstacles include that prosecutors’ offices lack sufficient staff and generally 
do not specialize in one type of crime.  Cooperation between prosecutors and police 
and between police across entity lines continues to be problematic.  Witness 
protection measures are rarely, if ever, employed, and witness support services are 
generally not available.  Prosecutors often fail to make use of available sources of 
evidence and do not take steps necessary to secure suspect attendance at trial.  
Defense attorneys generally lack access to training in relevant areas of law and are 
often inadequately, or not at all, compensated for their work.   
Id. 
65. Interview with “Protected Witness”, in Sarajevo, Bosnia (June–July 2013).  
66. Behind a Wall of Silence:  Prosecution of War Crimes in Croatia, AMNESTY INT’L (Dec. 9, 
2010), https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/eur64/003/2010/en/.pdf. 
67. Id. 
68. Id. at 20–30. 
69. BOGDAN IVANIŠEVIĆ, AGAINST THE CURRENT:  WAR CRIMES PROSECUTIONS IN SERBIA 15 
(2007). 
70. Id. at 16. 
71. Id. at 25. 
72. According to Bogdan Ivanišević: 
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Thus, there is both tremendous progress in war crimes prosecutions in 
the former Yugoslavia, yet, much work remains to be done. 
IV.  THE THREE–TIERED LEVELS OF PROSECUTIONS AS A MODEL FOR THE 
FUTURE & REFLECTIONS ON JUSTICE FOR CRIMES IN SYRIA  
What the ICTY and local war crime prosecutions have provided, in 
addition to their specific prosecutorial accomplishments, is also a potential 
model for the future.  Namely, for crimes perpetrated in Bosnia, as discussed 
above, there have been three tiers of justice—the ICTY, the hybrid War 
Crimes Chamber in Sarajevo, and local courts.73  A similar three-tiered 
approach has also existed for crimes perpetrated during the Rwandan 
genocide.74  There, the ICTR prosecuted top-level perpetrators in Arusha, 
Tanzania; mid-level perpetrators were tried in domestic court trials in 
Rwanda; and the remainder were tried before the Gacaca courts in Rwanda.75  
This multi-tiered approach could be a useful model when considering 
potential future justice options for any country that has suffered from large-
scale atrocity crimes. 
While it is currently impossible to predict whether the war in Syria will 
end with a political solution that leaves a government, or creates a coalition 
government, willing to engage in pursuing accountability, such an outcome 
should be a goal of the international community and people of Syria, so that 
justice for the mass atrocity crimes that have been perpetrated and are being 
                                                          
[I]t seems that the contribution of the trials to increasing public acceptance of the 
facts of war crimes is still limited.  For example, although one in three respondents 
was familiar with the allegations that Kosovo Albanians were victims of expulsion 
during the NATO bombing campaign, only [fifteen] percent of the respondents 
believed them. 
Id. at 36.  Troublingly, the post of War Crimes Prosecutor is now vacant. 
73. About the ICTY, UNITED NATIONS INT’L CRIM. TRIBUNAL FOR FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, 
http://www.icty.org/en/about (last visited Mar. 3, 2017); Bosnia and Herzegovina:  Local Courts Face 
Obstacles in War Crimes Trials, HUM. RTS. WATCH (July 10, 2008, 8:00 PM), https://www.hrw.org/ 
news/2008/07/10/bosnia-and-herzegovina-local-courts-face-obstacles-war-crimes-trials; Justice at Risk:  
War Crimes Trials in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Serbia and Montenegro, HUM. RTS. WATCH 
(Oct. 13, 2004), https://www.hrw.org/reports/2004/icty1004/icty1004.pdf.  
74. The ICTR in Brief, UNITED NATIONS MECHANISM FOR INT’L CRIM. TRIBUNALS, 
http://unictr.unmict.org/en/tribunal (last visited Mar. 3, 2017). 
75. Rwanda:  Justice After Genocide—20 Years on, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Mar. 28, 2014, 6:02 
AM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/03/28/rwanda-justice-after-genocide-20-years (discussing the 
different levels of justice—ICTR, domestic trials, and gacaca). 
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perpetrated there by multiple sides76 may be systematically addressed 
through a credible tribunal or set of tribunals. 
At present, the International Criminal Court (ICC)77 has no jurisdiction 
to prosecute the bulk of the crimes occurring in Syria, as Syria is not a State 
Party to the ICC’s Rome Statute,78 and Russia and China have vetoed U.N. 
Security Council referral of the situation to the ICC.79  As a result, currently, 
the Court only has limited jurisdiction, over foreign fighters in Syria who hail 
from Rome Statute States Parties.80  But even if full ICC jurisdiction existed, 
the ICC usually prosecutes only a handful of persons in any one situation 
country.81  That simply would not suffice for the kind of crime scenes 
occurring in Syria—for instance, where up to an estimated 1400 died in one 
chemical weapons attack alone in 2013.82  Thus, when there is a different 
political outcome in Syria that will allow the pursuit of justice,83 there will 
be a need for a tribunal, or multiple levels of tribunals, to adjudicate mass 
atrocity crimes committed on all sides, and, ideally, the top level tribunal—
whether fully international or a hybrid tribunal—should resemble the ICTY 
in terms of capacity.  This should be our model from which to draw upon for 
crimes committed in Syria, or any other country in the future that faces mass 
atrocity crimes where a combination of ICC prosecutions and local court 
                                                          
76. For findings on atrocity crimes perpetrated in Syria, see, e.g., Rep. of the U.N. Indep. Int’l 
Comm’n of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic on Its Thirtieth Session, U.N. Doc A/HRC/30/48 (2015). 
77. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90. 
78. For a listing of the States Parties to the ICC, see The States Parties to the Rome Statute, 
INT’L CRIM. CT., https://asp.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/asp/states%20parties/pages/the%20states%20parties% 
20to%20the%20rome%20statute.aspx (last visited Mar. 2, 2017). 
79. UN Bid to Refer Syria to ICC Vetoed, AL JAZEERA (May 23, 2014, 10:05 AM), 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/05/un-bid-refer-syria-icc-vetoed-20145221427105746 
65.html. 
80. See, e.g., Jennifer Trahan, New Paths to Accountability for Crimes in Syria and Iraq 
(Including ICC Jurisdiction Over Foreign Fighters), JUST SECURITY (Nov. 12, 2014, 8:59 AM), 
https://www.justsecurity.org/17308/paths-accountability-crimes-syria-iraq-including-icc-jurisdiction-
foreign-fighters/. 
81. There are currently twenty-three cases at the ICC, involving nine situation countries.  See 
Situations Under Investigation, INT’L CRIM. CT., https://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/situations 
%20and%20cases/Pages/situations%20and%20cases.aspx (last visited Mar. 2, 2017); 23 Cases, INT’L 
CRIM. CT., https://www.icc-cpi.int/pages/cases.aspx (last visited Mar. 2, 2017). 
82. Joby Warrick, More than 1,400 Killed in Syrian Chemical Weapons Attack, U.S. Says, 
WASH. POST (Aug. 30, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nearly-1500-
killed-in-syrian-chemical-weapons-attack-us-says/2013/08/30/b2864662-1196-11e3-85b6-d27422650f 
d5_story.html?utm_term=.ed9abab98303. 
83. Voluntary accession to the Rome Statute by Syria, or consent to the creation of an 
international or hybrid tribunal, or a specialized war crimes chamber in Syria, would all require a different 
Syrian government than the present one. 
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capacity84 cannot reasonably be expected to credibly handle the bulk of 
prosecutions. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The ICTY has made significant accomplishments in the justice it has 
rendered and in its jurisprudence, but, overall, has also left us with a three-
tiered model for international justice, with the existence of:  the ICTY, the 
War Crimes Chamber in Sarajevo, and local courts in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  
While not all have functioned perfectly, this vision of three-tiers of justice 
can serve as a model for the future.  As we someday, hopefully, contemplate 
how to achieve justice for crimes occurring in Syria, it is a useful model from 
which the international community should draw.  While the ICTY’s 
existence has not transformed society in Bosnia, it was never reasonable to 
think a tribunal could do so.  Twenty-one years after the Srebrenica massacre, 
there may be an unhappy peace that exists between the two entities in Bosnia, 
and also between Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats in the Cantons within 
the Federation, but it should now be for the people of the region to own this 
legacy and create a more enduring solution themselves.  Ultimately, it is hard 
to imagine any prosecutions occurring in the region, but for the creation of 
the ICTY. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
84. Local prosecutions can include use of a specialized chamber such as the International 
Crimes Division of the High Court in Uganda.  See Janet Anderson, Harriet Ssali Lule:  “What Matters 
is That There Are Victims”, JUST. HUB (Jan. 23, 2015, 11:10), https://justicehub.org/article/harriet-ssali-
lule-what-matters-there-are-victims; International Crimes Division, JUDICIARY:  REPUBLIC OF UGANDA, 
http://www.judiciary.go.ug/data/smenu/18/International%20Crimes%20Division.html (last visited Mar. 
13, 2017).  In July 2008, the Government of Uganda established the International Crimes Division to try 
individuals alleged to have committed international crimes during the 20-year insurgency in northern 
Uganda.  Anderson, supra; see also Justice for Serious Crimes Before National Courts Uganda’s 
International Crimes Division, HUM. RTS. WATCH, Jan. 2012, at 1. 
